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Harvests of violence - neglect of basic rights and the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria 
Hakeem O. Yusuf

 
Centre for Law, Crime and Justice School of Law, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK 
That poverty breeds insecurity and, eventually terrorism, is self-evident- Andris Pielbags1 
Abstract 
Drawing on core commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), and mostly, the ethic of 
emancipation, this article focuses on the Boko Haram insurgency to investigate recurring 
violent conflict in Nigeria. It identifies a governance gap not adverted to in the official 
narrative which has led to gross discontent at the lower levels of the society. The governance 
gap has created fertile breeding grounds for the recruitment of disillusioned youths who are 
easily mobilised to violence and lately, insurgency. There are normative and pragmatic 
reasons to adopt and prioritise social-welfare through the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural obligations and due process rights as a viable approach to at least reducing the 
spate of violence in the country. The discussion has relevance for resolving situations of 
violence and conflict in sub-Sahara Africa in particular and elsewhere in the developing 
world.  
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Introduction  
Since 2009, Nigeria has been caught in the grip of serious acts of violence; bombings, 
killings and destruction of property linked to the Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal 
Jihad (Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) commonly 
known as Boko Haram2 (western education/civilisation is evil). There is literature on the 
establishment and development of the group and the accounts will not be rehashed here 
(Walker 2012, Amnesty 2012; Maiangwa et al 2012 p. 45-49; Pham 2012; Adesoji 2010). 
Suffice it to say that the group has gained notoriety and it has engaged the Nigerian state in a 
running conflict on among others, the demand for an “Islamic State” at least in the Northern 
part, if not the whole of the country, and the unconditional release of its members detained by 
state security agents (Walker 2012, p. 11-12).  
Just like its response to the violence, the official narrative - and it is important to clarify that 
“official” here refers to the Federal Government of Nigeria which has responsibility for and 
control of all the security agencies in the country -  of the violence has been ambivalent. It 
attributes the violence to ethnic political opposition to the current administration. The 
government later included, indeed, emphasised that Boko Haram is a product of religious 
extremism requiring international counter-terrorism cooperation. Significantly however, 
relevant stakeholders, local voices at, close to, or otherwise connected to the epicentre of the 
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violence have maintained an alternative narrative. The alternative narrative locates the 
violence within the context of social displacement, social neglect, abject poverty and 
disenchantment with government and the state. Understanding of the socio-economic context 
as well as the analogous experience of the country with another insurgency supports the 
alternative narrative.  
 
The core argument of this article is that the neglect of basic rights, conceived here as 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESC rights) and due process by the Nigerian state have 
combined to foster recurring violence in different parts of the country. There is a governance 
gap which has led to gross discontent at the lower levels of the society. In order to address the 
resulting state of insecurity and curb the propensity for the development of such groups in the 
future, the state and the political elite have to commit to a fundamental socio-political and 
legal restructuring that accords human dignity to the country’s teeming population and in 
particular, youths, who confront bleak prospects of self-actualisation.  
 
This article proceeds as follows. The analysis adopts the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) 
approach to identify and discuss the factors that have fostered and promoted violence, 
insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. It moves on to an examination of the context of violence 
and conflict in the country. This is followed by a focus on the divergent discourse on the 
violence and how to deal with it. The article then proceeds to an analysis of the appropriate 
measures for addressing the challenge of conflict and insurgency through a CTS approach. I 
explore the core-commitments of CTS and in particular, the ethic of emancipation to propose 
strategies that are basic rights-sensitive in addressing the untoward situation. There are 
normative and pragmatic reasons to adopt and prioritise social-welfare through the 
implementation of ESC obligations and due process rights as a viable approach to address the 
spate of violence in the country. The discussion has relevance for resolving situations of 
violence and conflict in sub-Sahara Africa in particular and elsewhere. 
Conceptual approach 
Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) 
In the critical studies tradition, CTS scholars challenge orthodox accounts and mainstream 
scholarship on terrorism. Stemming from the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, CTS 
scholarship adopts empirical, normative, ethical and theoretical approaches that question the 
methods and arguments of mainstream practices of governments and the supporting 
scholarship. CTS problematizes the mainstream approaches to terrorism which characterises 
terrorism as conduct of mentally imbalanced individuals and groups (McDonald 2007; 
Michel and Richards 2009) driven mainly by an unjust desire to subvert democracy or in 
general, the “liberal,” “progressive” and “civilised” western tradition ((Al Sumait, Lingle and 
Domke 2009, Stohl 2008). This latter point is especially true of the characterisation of so 
called “religious terrorism” in “Mainstream Terrorism Studies” (MTS) (Gunning and Jackson 
2011) which is the common description of groups like the Boko Haram. Further, as a research 
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orientation, CTS challenges the assumed knowledge and understandings of terrorism. It 
critiques MTS for (largely) uncritically legitimising the “War on Terror” in an international 
system ridden with inequities and hegemony (Breen Smyth et al 2008).  
While urging reflexivity, CTS challenges the state-centric focus of terrorism analysis which 
has meant problematizing the “terrorist” as a security threat to the neglect of the critical issue 
of how the state creates the conditions in which terrorist action occurs (Gunning 2007b, pp. 
371-377; Jarvis 2009, pp. 7-14). CTS adopts an approach that emphasises “universal human 
security” as against the conventional focus on the security of the state. This requires a focus 
on all factors that limit human actualisation (Breen Smyth 2007, p. 262; Booth 2005).  The 
objective is not to oppose the state and policy-makers in the quest for security, but rather, to 
speak truth to power in a way that maximises the opportunities for change. Far from being an 
“appeasement of tyranny,” CTS is “a vigorous anti-terror project based on fundamental 
human rights and values, and a concern for social justice, equality” for eradicating “structural 
and physical violence and discrimination” (Jackson 2007, p. 250). As we will see, these 
values are central to the discussion in this article.  
CTS adopts an epistemological approach that recognises the complexity of power relations 
and avoids totalising analyses in evaluating the issue of political terror. On this view, the 
appreciation of historicity; the social context, is critical to ensuring a robust, fair and effective 
engagement with political terror at the local and global level. Thus, CTS rejects 
exceptionalising the experience of any society, historical period or set of events of political 
terror (Breen Smyth 2007, pp. 262-263, Gunning 2007b, pp. 371-374). Addressing political 
violence in this way, especially with a view to ensuring policy relevance, requires adopting 
an ethic of emancipation (Heath-Kelly, 2010; McDonald 2007; Gunning 2007b, pp. 239-
242). As a normative concern of Critical Theory generally, emancipation refers to “a 
commitment to removing the sources of violence and oppression that confront people as 
individuals and communities” (Jackson et al 2011, p. 277). Emancipation in the context of 
CTS can be defined as “the realisation of greater human freedom and human potential and 
improvements in individual and social actualisation and well-being” (Jackson 2007, p. 249). 
It has also been defined by McDonald (2007, pp. 254) as “the process of freeing up space for 
dialogue and deliberation, and the diffusion of power to ‘speak’ security.”  
A CTS approach to terrorism studies provides an appropriate point of departure for 
interrogating the causes of violence in what is sometimes less than accurately described as 
“ethno-religious” conflicts, and in particular, the recent experience of the Boko Haram crisis 
in Nigeria. This is because, as stated earlier, the official narrative on the insurgency in the 
country follows at best, a MTS approach which has not only failed to make the world a safer 
place, but has been criticised for compounding the contemporary security situation around the 
world (Herring and Stokes 2011; Gunning and Jackson 2011).  
Further, a CTS approach is useful for delving behind the scenes to identify neglected 
narratives which not only supplements mainstream accounts but provides a robust account of 
the causes and motivations of terrorist violence. As a frame of analysis, CTS involves an 
ontological commitment that “entails an ongoing process of intellectual engagement (rather 
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than a fixed position or endpoint) with a wide range of perspectives and approaches”. It not 
only rejects exceptionalism, but also seeks to “prioritise specificity, context, history, and 
nuance” in the area of terrorism studies (Jackson 2009, p. 4). It thus concretely expands the 
scope for engaging with, and reducing the security challenges terrorism poses to society 
(Herring and Stokes 2011, p. 2). CTS directly addresses “conditions that can be seen to impel 
actors to resort to terrorist tactics” (Jackson 2009, p. 6), a central concern of this article. 
A “basic rights-sensitive” approach 
The desire for achieving not just a “victory” over terrorist groups but instituting sustainable 
peace in a liberal society drives the choice of adopting an approach that positively defuses the 
recurring tensions and violence in Nigeria. A “basic rights – sensitive” approach is 
particularly fitting for the context. This is because as it will be shown below, the context is 
fraught with sometimes gross violations of human rights which have persisted alongside 
institutionalised corruption in the midst of vast natural resources, including but not limited to 
oil and natural gas. This approach should contribute significantly to instituting a system that 
substantially reduces the incidence of gross discontent, and the sense of social injustice that 
commonly, if not invariably, underpins violence in the nature of violent insurgence and 
terrorism. 
The idea of rights frames the relationship that exists between individuals, the state and 
increasingly, even important non-state actors (Alston 2005). The basic rights sensitive 
approach as conceived here refers to the recognition of the dignity of citizens through the 
implementation of ESC rights and state-led application of due process in the conduct of 
governance and use of power. This includes the need to curb political corruption which has 
been a significant cause of poor infrastructure, underdevelopment and pauperisation of large 
numbers of citizens in Nigeria. 
Recourse to a rights-sensitive approach for addressing political violence in this way is not 
simply a moral or altruistic choice but rather, one with substantive expediential value. A 
former United States ambassador to Nigeria acknowledged that far-reaching governance-
related changes were the solution to upheavals like the Boko Haram (Hansen and Musa 2013, 
p. 291). This is in recognition of how such grievances predispose the masses to sympathising 
with Boko Haram and such other groups (Weinstein 2007). There has been an evolution in 
practices of insurgent movements and they now commonly seek to gain the support of the 
local population in areas of their operation as a strategic measure to enhance their viability 
(Reno 2012). It is relevant in this regard to point out for instance that in its early period, Boko 
Haram received some local support because of its welfare programmes for a largely 
impoverished population (Hansen and Musa 2013; p. 290). Thus, rather than the emphasis on 
militarisation, the government is much better off addressing the “legitimate grievances” that 
have predisposed “meaningful segments of the population in the North” to groups like the 
Boko Haram’s message of “overturning the status quo in Nigeria” (Pham 2012, p. 7). It is 
now appropriate to turn to justification of this framework through an exploration of the 
context.     
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Scorecard of neglect: conflict and violence in Nigeria  
The governance gap  
The institutionalisation of a governance gap has become a common experience in many 
developing countries, especially in sub-Sahara Africa. The governance gap refers to a gulf 
that has developed between citizens and the state as a result of the lack of credible leadership 
and the implementation of programmes that bear little or no positive impact on the social 
development of the people. The governance gap leads to social disillusionment and produces 
large numbers of citizens who become disconnected from the state and its institutions. Such 
individuals slip through institutional arrangements to become easy recruits in the hands of all 
forms of ethnic, political and religious irredentists who challenge the state (Maiangwa et al 
2012, p. 44; Jackson 2007, p. 599). 
It is pertinent to the argument made in this article to be clear about the socio-economic and 
political situation in Nigeria, particularly in the context of the post-authoritarian transition 
from 1999 and even previous to it. The country has witnessed some of the most egregious 
disregard for basic rights – ESC rights and due process – during both periods. The country’s 
experience in its post-colonial period has situated Nigerian society in a governance gap. The 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic country typifies the legacy of British colonialism in sub-
Sahara Africa.
3
 Nigeria’s huge natural resources have not been translated into development 
for its teeming population. It has had a severely chequered history of sustained development 
and democratic governance. Most of its post-independence experience of statehood has been 
under authoritarian military (mis) rule. 
Successive military regimes perfected plunder, compromised all institutions of state and 
generally directed them towards flagrant violations of human rights of the people.
 
Human 
rights abuses were prevalent. The population suffered repression, state-sponsored murder and 
restrictions on civil liberties, among others. The military treated the country like conquered 
territory and its vast resources as “spoils of war.” Under military rule, the country 
transformed rapidly from one of the richest nations at independence, to one of the poorest.  
Although military incursions into power were proclaimed to be in pursuit of economic 
rectitude, unity and peace of the country, arguably none of these was achieved by the 
numerous military regimes. Rather, the military institutionalised corruption which has 
remained a formidable challenge to development and good governance in the country (Yusuf 
2007, pp. 269-270; Okonjo-Iweala 2012, p. 2).  
 
According to the Energy Information Agency, the country’s 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil 
reserves places it at the vantage position of being the largest producer of oil in Africa and 
tenth largest in the world (2012, p. 3). Seizing on soaring oil prices in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, successive military regimes quickly shifted emphasis from agriculture to crude oil 
exploitation. The government replaced agriculture as the leading foreign exchange earner; a 
situation which has persisted ever since with attendant neglect of the historical mainstay of 
the economy of most communities in the country (Falola 2008, p. 3). Crude oil has come to 
6 
 
account for over 90% of the country’s total foreign earnings (Energy Information 2012, p. 1). 
Most of the oil (and gas) reserves are located within the country’s Niger Delta area, in the 
south but most of the area lacks basic infrastructure. Ethnic and regional militias sprung up in 
response and remained there and in some other parts of the country. To contain expressions 
of social discontent, military regimes in Nigeria militarised the Niger Delta. The ethnic 
militias mainly demand more autonomy and local control of natural resources in their 
respective areas in the virtually unitarised federal polity (Aghedo 2012, pp. 270-271). 
The acute experience of a governance gap in the last twelve years is ironic because the 
country had never earned more in its post-independence existence. A very recent appraisal of 
the country’s economic performance stated that it has achieved “a robust increase in GDP 
from 2.9 per cent in the 1990s to 8.9 per cent in the following decade.” But poverty rates 
have not only increased, it has in reality continued to rise with the northern part being worst 
hit (Joseph 2012, p. 14). The northern part of the country, following decades of social and 
infrastructural neglect “has been in economic free fall.” This is at a time when the country’s 
legislators are reportedly the highest paid in the world; $189,000 per annum placing them at a 
whopping 116 times over the country’s average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
(Economist 20 July 2013). Despite strong criticisms, the legislators have resisted the 
executive branch’s attempts to reduce the outrageous emoluments (Daily Trust 23 July 2013).  
Remarkably, while prevailing inequality continues to breed conflict in different parts of the 
country as elsewhere on the continent, analyses of insecurity and vicious cycles of violence in 
Africa usually fail to take cognisance of “underlying” causes. It is logical to assume that 
recommendations from such “analyses,” lacking in positive rigour, will deliver inadequate, if 
not misleading policy guidance with deepening frustration for all involved. While it is easy to 
ascribe violence in countries like Nigeria to religious revivalism, many such analyses suffer 
from inadequate investigation of the true causes of persisting violence in Africa; “discordant 
development” (Joseph 2012, p. 14).  
Harvests of violence  
Analyses of terrorism have for too long proceeded and are dominated by neglect of context. 
Breen Smyth et al have observed that the current study of terrorism, occurs largely in a  
political, legal, cultural, and academic context…in which fascination with terrorism 
encourages moral panics and an excessive focus on violence, to the neglect of the 
wider social, historical, and often mundane milieu in which it is situated. (2008, p. 1-
2)  
A desire to rectify that principal failing is one of the fundamental justifications for the 
emergence of CTS. Thus, from a CTS perspective, comprehensive understanding of the 
context of the violence is germane to an accurate analysis of the on-going experience of 
insurgency (Toros and Gunning 2009).   
The social context of violence in Nigeria is that of gross social deprivation in “the midst of 
plenty” (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 1). While many of the incidences of violence 
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have been attributed to religion, this is usually obfuscation of the reality. The link to religion 
is mostly accidental and a nuanced analysis discloses that ethnicity plays an important role in 
various incidents reported as religious violence in the country. This is due to the fact that for 
the most part, “ethnic boundaries” are essentially coterminous with religious identity;4 
making it more appropriate to talk in terms of “ethno-religious” conflicts in the country. Even 
that, as mentioned earlier, is in many cases less than accurate, for as Azam relevantly 
observes,  
most of the time the reference to ethnicity is used as a ready-made explanation for the 
eruption of civil wars, especially in the mass media, while a closer look at the facts 
suggests that it falls short of providing even the beginning of an explanation. (2001, p. 
429) 
Beyond the façade of ethnicity and religion, there is usually the quest for political power and 
the economic control (Ukiwo 2003, p. 120-129; Dowden 2008, pp. 452-453). An external 
view may suggest that religious differences accounts for the conflicts in the country but a 
careful and closer look reveals that “politics—more precisely, control of government 
patronage—is the primary cause of many of these conflicts” (Walker 2012, p. 1).  
Given the context of the Boko Haram insurgency, there are, from a CTS perspective, very 
strong reasons to consider the abject poverty that prevails in the region of its origin (Pham 
2012, 2) as a major cause for the current state of violence and insecurity there. A developing 
body of research has identified a complex and dynamic relationship between poverty and 
insecurity. As Rice recently argued, “Basic intuition suggests that such pervasive poverty and 
grotesque disparities breed resentment, hostility, and insecurity” (2007, p. 32).  
Two main lines, of many hypothetical causes of violent conflict, have been identified. The 
first line points at political repression, the other, economic conditions and specifically 
poverty. While it is conceded that repression does engender conflict, the evidence in support 
of poverty as the major cause of violent conflicts is quite robust; economic factors trump 
political ones (Miguel 2007, p. 55). This is what Miguel refers to as the “poverty-violence 
nexus” (2007, p. 51).  After World War II, majority of wars leading to over 40 million deaths 
have been within rather than between countries (Kahl 2006). Most of the conflicts “have 
occurred in the world’s poorest nations” and sub-Sahara Africa (which Nigeria forms a part) 
is worst hit (2007, p. 51). 
To understand the context of the Boko Haram crisis and how this fits well into the “poverty-
violence nexus” it is useful to recall the legacy of military authoritarianism in the country. At 
the dawn of its transition to civil rule on 29 May 1999, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
attempted to engage with this past through a truth-seeking process conducted under the 
Human Rights Violations Investigations Commission (the Oputa Panel). The truth-seeking 
process remains quite valuable as a “soul-searching” and stock-taking process for 
establishing the legacy of nearly three decades of military rule in the country (Yusuf 2013, p. 
160-165).  
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The Oputa Panel’s report was never implemented ostensibly due to a legal challenge brought 
by three former military heads of state to challenge its powers in issuing summons 
compelling their attendance as witnesses before it. Still, it provides a very useful insight into 
the situation of human rights violations in the country following nearly three decades of 
military authoritarian rule (Yusuf 2013, Yusuf 2007). Its depth and insight on the malaise 
afflicting the Nigerian society remains unparalleled. Abject poverty, social dislocation, 
poverty and violation of human rights by security agents of the state; legacies of authoritarian 
military rule, detailed in the report remain germane a decade after the completion of the work 
of the Oputa Panel. With specific reference to the north-eastern part of the country; epicentre 
of the Boko Haram insurgency, the situation remains grim. Social deprivation; poor 
educational facilities, unprecedented high levels of youth unemployment, mass poverty and 
corruption are key drivers of feelings of exclusion among the majority there (Adesoji 2010, p. 
100) and to varying extents, in other parts of the country. 
 
“Dealing” with Boko Haram – politics, divergent narratives and counter-
violence 
The response to violence and terror takes three broad forms namely militarizing, 
criminalizing and the liberal approach (Jarvis 2009, p. 12). The military response typically 
conceives political violence or insurgent activity is a branch of warfare which necessitates 
military action. Those who advocate this approach argue that terrorism as a form of 
unconventional warfare and must be repelled as such because bargaining or negotiations will 
not resolve the problem it poses (Chellaney 2002, p. 108-108; Jarvis 2009, p. 12). 
Criminalizing political violence as a response to it stems from the view that it is a criminal 
rather than a military problem (Jarvis 2009, p. 12-13; Archibugi and Young 2002). The 
liberal approach differs from the other two approaches as it views political terror as a 
“symptom of underlying dynamics.” On this account, political terror signals the existence of 
a fundamental problem (s) which requires an entirely different form (s) of solution depending 
on its roots (Jarvis 2009, p. 13). Solutions may range from diplomacy to favourable economic 
policies and foreign aid. This is arguably a more viable approach to dealing with political 
terror while recognising that there may be some value in the application of some elements of 
the other two approaches (Jarvis 2009, p. 13).  
The Nigerian experience has moved through and combined these approaches over time. The 
government has deployed security forces; now mainly soldiers, to the four states that have 
witnessed the most violence from the Boko Haram insurgents over time and recently declared 
a state of emergency there. Government also recently set up a Presidential Committee on 
Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North with the remit to 
explore peace in exchange for amnesty for the insurgents (Leadership 19 April 2013). The 
State has in addition proceeded with the prosecution of few alleged members of the group. 
Four individuals were convicted on terrorism charges by a federal high court in the summer 
of 2013 under terrorism legislation with very severe terms of imprisonment (The Nation 10 
July 2013). 
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The political response – a pall of ambivalence  
The political response of the central government to the Boko Haram insurgency has been 
marked by palpable ambivalence. One of the indicators of that ambivalence is the continuing 
shifting position of government policy on the group. Thus for instance, at different times and 
sometimes in quick succession, leading government officials; including the President, his 
ministers and his chief-spokesman, have contradicted one another on efforts at dialogue with 
the group (The Sun 20 July 2013).  
As mentioned earlier, the official narrative partly ascribes the violence to overzealous 
religious fervour and the increased trend of terrorism globally. Spokesman for the President’s 
political party stated that  
It is clear that some people are out to perpetrate acts of terrorism in Nigeria to create a 
semblance of insecurity as it obtains in other troubled spots of the world. (Vanguard 
26 January 2013) 
President Goodluck Jonathan in a CNN interview was similarly emphatic that the insurgency 
was neither a product of misrule or poverty but a “local terror group” whose existence 
threatens Africa as a whole (Punch 24 January 2013). It was thus not surprising that President 
Jonathan not only expressed delight and support for the United State government’s 
declaration of bounties for information leading to the capture of the leaders of the group, he 
followed suit with an Order proscribing the group under the country’s terrorism legislation 
(Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011), barely a day after the US action (News Agency of 
Nigeria June 17, 2013). The proscription order is rather curious given that the group was 
never registered nor legally recognised under the country’s laws. One explanation for this 
appears to be that such action improves the chances of the government in enlisting military 
and related support from its western allies as part of the ubiquitous “War on Terror” led by 
the United States (Blanquart 2012, p. 32-34). In any event, official ambivalence becomes 
more evident when it is considered that the proscription was declared a short while after the 
authorities had set up a national committee to explore dialogue with and amnesty for 
violence-renouncing members of the group. 
As indicated earlier, this narrative finds its place in the globalized discourse of counter-
terrorism arising from “the spread of radical Islamist ideologies” (Solomon 2012, p. 8), 
“Islamic fundamentalism” or “Islamic extremism” resulting in militancy or terrorism (Cook 
2011; Solomon 2012). Adesoji (2011, p. 99-119) argues that Boko Haram is essentially a 
product of deep-rooted problem of Islamic fundamentalism. According to him, from the 
1980s, there has been an upsurge of religious extremism in the country resulting in incessant 
religious conflicts. He traces the origins of the religious crisis to the acrimonious debates 
about the place of Shari’a during the Constituent Assembly discussions in 1977-1978 leading 
to the promulgation of the 1979 Constitution. He identified the Shi’ite movement led by 
Ibrahim Zakzaky as precursor of political violence in the northern part of the country with the 
“major manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism” being the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 to 
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1985 (p. 100). The emergence of the Boko Haram Adesoji further argues, is also attributable 
to the lack of political will to deal with previous experiences of religious fundamentalism, 
part of a general problem of impunity in the country. Isa (2012) shares these views but further 
traces the origins of “Islamic militancy” and recurring incidences of violence by Muslim 
groups in Northern Nigeria to the early 19
th
 century. Uthman dan Fodio sought to revitalise 
the practice of Islam and led a rebellion against perceived corrupt political and religious 
practices of the Hausa Habe Muslim rulers. Bagaji et al (2012) similarly contend that groups 
like the Boko Haram derive inspiration from the success of the Khomeini revolution and 
desire to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria.  
However, as mentioned earlier, there is another strand of the official narrative which views 
the insurgency as a contrivance of political opposition to President Jonathan. On this view, 
the insurgency has been created by elements among the political elite in the Northern part of 
the country who were opposed to Jonathan’s emergence as president in the 2011 general 
elections. A senior presidential media aide alleged that the violence in the country was a 
product of a call for violence by the leading opponent to the incumbent following the 
controversial elections (The Nation 9 November 2012). The same sentiments were expressed 
by President Jonathan at the launch of an initiative to promote inter-faith dialogue in the 
country (This Day 23 November 2012). In line with the ethnic-politics narrative, retired (now 
late) army General and erstwhile National Security Adviser, Owoye Azazi, stated that 
“violence did not increase in Nigeria until when there was a declaration by the current 
President that he was going to contest” (The Nation 5 May 2012, see also Blanquart 
2012).This narrative presumably informs the militarisation approach of the federal 
government to the insurgency despite recent parallel moves towards dialogue and peaceful 
resolution of the crisis. However, this aspect of the official position fails to advert to the fact 
that the first major incident with Boko Haram including the extra-judicial killing of its leader 
in 2009 occurred during the tenure of a Northern Muslim President, Umar Yar ‘Adua who 
died in 2010 (Pham 2012 3; Walker 2012, p. 4). Walker (2012, p. 8) highlights the irony in 
the ethnic-politics narrative by observing that at about the same time President Jonathan was 
announcing an increase in the cost of petroleum products, he stated that his government had 
been infiltrated by Boko Haram (see also Solomon 2012, 10). President Jonathan thus 
“painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved northern politicians to 
bring down his southern government” (Walker 2012, p. 8).  
The ambivalence in the government’s approach complicates the experience of cross-violence 
perpetrated either by the insurgents (or by others) and that perpetrated by security agents 
drafted in to counter them. This has alienated the people and made it virtually impossible to 
secure required cooperation with security agencies. Even with the violence wrought by 
subversive groups like the Boko Haram, the state remains for many, a very distant entity with 
political elite that plunders the country’s resources (Ukiwo 2003, p. 131-133; Walker 2009, p. 
13-14). In the post-authoritarian period, the majority had become alienated from a political 
elite made up mostly of retired military rulers or their protégés leading to a questioning of the 
legitimacy of the new regime (Ukiwo 2003, p. 134). The experience of manipulated elections 
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and escalation of political corruption has accentuated feelings of disillusionment (Yusuf 
2011; Omotola 2010). 
Worse still is the militarised response of the state approach, lacking as it is, in modern 
policing and intelligence techniques (Solomon 2012, p. 8). The “consistently brutal” 
approach of the security agencies in “dealing” with the Boko Haram has been 
“counterproductive.” It has sustained and fuelled the group’s expansion rather than curb it. 
The people are even more alienated than ever in the crisis because the tactics of the police has 
made it more difficult for members of the group to be apprehended. The tactics of the 
security agencies has led to a situation where people in two major cities caught in the 
violence “are, for the most part, more scared of the police and the army than they are of Boko 
Haram” (Walker 2012, p. 12-13). The people are literally caught in what one respondent told 
Amnesty International is a “lose lose situation” (2012, p. 3): Some people are killed by 
violent groups like the Boko Haram, others by state security agencies.  
A Counter Narrative 
Politics and terrorism interact in ways that indicate a struggle for power (Schmid 2004, pp. 
199-202). “Governments and career politicians,” as Kassimeris notes, “have always been 
tempted to exploit disasters” to achieve their political aims (2008, 4; Herring and Stoke 2011, 
2). Similar is the case with Nigeria. In the Nigerian experience the official narrative has 
played on ethnicity to delegitimise or evade an alternative, arguably superior and empirically 
ascertainable narrative.  The core of that alternative narrative is that the Boko Haram 
insurgency, like many others before it (Ogundiya 2009; Omeje 2009) is deeply rooted in a 
legacy of gross deprivation, violations of human rights and social dislocation that is most 
acute in the north eastern part of the country. Danjibo points out that while religious 
fundamentalism plays an important part in the emergence of groups like the Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, it would be wrong to limit its causation to this. Rather, “failure of good governance” 
is “perhaps the most viable explanation” for the recurring cycles of violence in the country 
(2009, p. 15-18). Maiangwa et al similarly identify the circumstance of the failed state as well 
as frustration and aggression theory as central to the emergence and sustenance of the Boko 
Haram insurgency (2012, p. 43-44).  
Many public figures in the country share the view that poor or non-existing social welfare 
policies are directly linked to the Boko Haram insurgency. A former Inspector General of 
Police and National Security Adviser from the northern part of the country recently stated 
that years of “bad leadership” and neglect of the “ordinary man” was responsible for the spate 
of violence in the country (The Nation 8 January 2012). Kashim Shettima, Governor of Borno 
State, which along with Yobe is the most affected site of the insurgency, was emphatic about 
the critical role poverty plays in the crisis. He stated in an interview that despite his 
“misguided ideology”, the late leader of the Boko Haram was able to retain the loyalty of his 
followers through among others, provision of a meal a day to each member, setting up a 
youth empowerment scheme and organising cheap marriages among them. This apparently 
gave such followers a sense of self-worth (Daily Trust 20 February 2012). This constitutes an 
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effective exploitation of the governance gap relating to the provision of social welfare 
provisions.  
With the benefit of local experience, the Governor of a major oil producing state in the Niger 
Delta also stated that most of those involved in “Boko Haram-related activities” were persons 
mainly between the ages of 18 and 21 years. According to him, they were victims of 
“political and socio-economic violence” who then resorted to physical violence. He 
emphasised that provision of free education, water, and infrastructural facilities like roads and 
electricity was essential to dissuade the people from resort to violence. Youths busy in 
education will not “have time to be actively involved in Boko Haram activities” he reasoned 
(The Guardian, 26 May 2012). In other words, instituting basic rights-sensitive governance 
will go a long way in addressing discontent which is at the root of or at least, significantly 
sustains the violence. Provision of social-welfare services by the state is crucial for stability 
as this influences the “preferences and capacities of social actors in ways that, on balance, 
discourage terrorism.” Such provisions by the state diminishes “incentives to commit or 
tolerate terrorism” and weakens “extremist political and religious organizations and practice 
that provide economic and cognitive security where public safety nets are lacking” (Burgoon 
2006, p. 177). The Boko Haram experience bears this out. 
 
Addressing the challenge of conflict and insurgency 
Research has identified failure of the state to provide some of the fundamental needs of the 
people like health and education as a core cause of many conflicts. Social welfare policies 
can positively impact on the level of violence and terrorism (Azam 2001, p. 442; Taydas and 
Peksen p. 2012). Significantly, “state-security” and “counter-terrorism” focused research 
recognises the important place of socio-economic factors in the Boko Haram crisis. Forest’s 
work is representative of this group. Focusing on Boko Haram in a book aimed at assisting 
US Special Operations Forces understand “religiously- inspired domestic terrorism” (2012, p. 
3), he considers that the group is “largely a product of widespread socioeconomic and 
religious insecurities, and its ideology resonates among certain communities because of both 
historical narratives and modern grievances” (2012, 1).  
As I indicated earlier, a liberal approach is one of the ways of responding to severe political 
violence. Such a liberal approach accommodates governance and institutional reforms. This 
approach ought to be prioritised in addressing Boko Haram crises in Nigeria in view of the 
background which suggests crass neglect and a dysfunctional socio-economic system. The 
prioritisation of ESC rights and institutionalisation of due process are critical measures for 
addressing the harvest of violence that is being experienced in the country.  
Imperative of instituting economic, social, and cultural rights  
Paden has observed that in non-Western cultures like that of Nigeria, economic, political, 
religious, social and other dimensions of culture overlap. It is imperative that social sciences 
analyses understand this reality in studying and addressing conflict in such contexts (Paden 
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2005, p. 3-4). The Boko Haram crisis is the latest in a series of recurring violence in Nigeria 
while the Niger Delta remains relatively restive (Aghedo 2012, p. 270-271; Adesoji 2010). 
Adopting Paden’s view, addressing a crisis like the Boko Haram requires a holistic view of 
the situation. This includes paying attention to the socio-economic context of the Boko 
Haram insurgency.  
ESC rights unlike civil and political rights are still non-justiciable in the country. Redressing 
that situation is an imperative for significantly diffusing social tensions in the country on a 
sustainable basis. Fulfilling the legal obligations created by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights (African Charter) are apt for this purpose as Nigeria is party to both 
instruments which provide for ESC rights (having acceded to ICESCR and ratified African 
Charter in 1993 and 1983 respectively). However, because Nigeria operates a dualist tradition 
in its constitutional practice on the implementation of treaties, the country’s ratification of 
international treaties like the ICESCR do not imply the direct application of the provisions of 
such instruments domestically (Egede 2007 and Enabulele 2009). There is a clear 
requirement under Section 12 (1) of the 1999 Constitution that the provisions of such treaties 
be incorporated by domestic legislation for them to be binding on persons, authorities and 
institutions in the country. While there has been some recognition of the significance of the 
country’s obligations under international treaties to which she is party, this does not go far 
enough to enable citizens demand compliance with the country’s international law 
obligations. In Abacha v Fawehinmi the Supreme Court stated that the legal implications of 
such treaties are such that “they might have an indirect effect upon the construction of 
statutes or might give rise to a legitimate expectation by citizens that the government, in its 
acts affecting them, would observe the terms of the treaty” (2000, p. 586).  
Despite ratifying the ICESCR, ESC rights in Nigeria, like in many developing countries, are 
essentially non-justiciable. While the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act of 1990 domesticates the African Charter, this is not the 
case with the ICESCR. Even with the domestication of the African Charter, the country’s 
laws (and certainly the 1999 Constitution, ‘the Constitution’) as stated earlier, does not offer 
full or substantive protection for ESC rights with perhaps the notable exception of the much 
untested right to non-discrimination. However, by virtue of the customary international law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT), the country is bound by the provisions of the treaties. Article 26 of 
the VCLT provides that “every treaty in force is binding upon the state parties” to it and this 
must “be performed by them in good faith.”  This binds state parties to observance of the 
provisions of any treaty on ratification or accession as either signifies a positive intention to 
perform the obligations of the treaty. “Treaties” as Shaw notes, “are express agreements and 
are a form of substitute legislation undertaken by states” (2008, p. 94).  
Successive constitutions from 1979 have provided for economic and social entitlements as 
part of the “fundamental objectives” and “directive principles of state policy” which have 
been no more than “exhortations of best practice” (Yusuf 2008, 86). Ironically, they 
recognise precisely the category of ESC rights that ought to be guaranteed alongside the civil 
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and political rights protected by the Constitution. For instance they contain provisions 
requiring the state to “direct its policy” towards providing “suitable and adequate shelter, 
suitable and adequate food, reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and 
pensions, and unemployment, sick benefits and welfare of the disabled” for all citizens. The 
State is also to “strive to eradicate illiteracy; provide free education at all levels, including 
University education “when practicable” (Sections 13-22, 1999 Constitution).  
The core commitments of CTS, as discussed earlier, are germane to the context of the Boko 
Haram insurgency and violence. A focal point of that commitment, as we have seen, is the 
adoption of an ethic of emancipation. In its most basic form, this ethic translates into a 
concern for individual freedom and actualisation as a measure to forestall or at least, reduce 
the incidence and intensity of political violence (McDonald 2007). It is striking to note how 
most of the non-justiciable and unimplemented provisions of the Constitution relate to the 
absence of an ethic of emancipation and deprivation of freedoms in the country. The lack of 
commitment to issues of social welfare feature has continued to generate feelings of 
discontent and gross neglect among the majority in the country. These feelings, as stated 
earlier, are either the main causes of, or at least substantially linked to the resort to violence 
by various individuals and groups who have been mobilised under ethnic or religious 
platforms.  
Empirical research, especially in the field of peace and conflict studies, indicates that the 
volume of welfare spending plays a direct role in the predisposition of citizens to violence 
and conflict. States can significantly reduce the likelihood of civil war and decrease dissent in 
the society through the provision of social welfare services (Azam 2001; Taydas and Peksen 
2012). Such provisions ties in closely with the obligations of government for fulfilling ESC 
rights as conceived here. Through the provision of “public services” and creation of “social 
safety nets,” states can prevent the otherwise disadvantaged from becoming desperate and 
susceptible to recruitment into the ranks of those with an agenda of destabilization. This 
strengthens the credibility as well as legitimacy of the state. “Simply put,” Taydas and Peksen 
argue, “by spending on public goods and offering benefits in return for citizen loyalty, 
governments can co-opt political opposition and reduce incentives to join rebel movements” 
(2012, p. 274). It is thus crucial in seeking to understand or address situations of insurgency 
to advert to this violence-conducing environment created by the state, one of the issues to 
which CTS directs attention in studies of political violence.  
Contrary to the nature of its obligations as outlined above, Nigeria has continued to treat 
implementation of ESC rights with levity and suspicion. It follows a tradition in many 
developing countries (and even in varying degrees, some developed ones) which violates the 
principle of indivisibility of rights, dichotomising human rights into positive and negative 
rights. ESC rights are being treated as the “normatively underdeveloped stepchild of the 
human rights family” (Wood 2003, p. 676). This is because ESC rights are wrongly viewed 
as requiring state commitment of resources while civil and positive rights are considered as 
requiring negative obligations of non-interference. This approach has being vigorously 
contested in recent times (Baderin and McCoquordale 2007; Gauri and Brinks 2008). In any 
event, given the huge misappropriation of the public resources, there is a sound argument to 
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be made that the country at least has reasonable capacity for instituting economic and social 
rights (Lawan 2011, p. 63). 
The Arab Spring has demonstrated that securing basic rights of access to food, health and 
shelter is no longer a matter of choice but ought to be regarded as a priority both in national 
jurisdictions and the international system. The United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has noted that it was the denial of “the most 
basic elements of a life in dignity” that impelled Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian to set 
himself alight thereby setting “a spark that lit the fire of the Arab Spring.” It further noted 
that the experience “exposed the fallacy of the assumption that economic or social progress 
can be achieved in isolation from enjoyment of human rights” (OHCHR 2011, p. 62). Taking 
a cue from the experience of the Arab Spring, many opinion leaders in Nigeria have 
emphasised the need to address poverty as a major cause of violence and conflict in the 
country. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military leader and two times civilian president, 
expressed “fear” of likely breakout of “violent revolution” in the country unless the 
government took steps to urgently redress the appalling socio-economic situation (Daily 
Trust 12 November 2012).  
Local Learning: The Niger Delta experience  
Usually, arguments of the nature made in the foregoing for introducing measures to address 
violence in one particular jurisdiction usually find vindication in comparative experiences 
elsewhere. Significantly however, the argument made so far on the need for ESC rights as a 
measure for achieving sustainable peace in Nigeria finds vindication also in a parallel 
experience in another troubled area of the country; the  Niger Delta. Despite the fact that the 
oil from the Niger Delta region constitutes about 90% of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings, it also lacks basic infrastructure like electricity, health care facilities, potable water, 
roads and youth unemployment is high.  
Most human rights violations in the Niger Delta involved communities making it easy to 
mobilise youths of those communities to protests against the state (Oluwaniyi 2010). This is 
especially with regard to ecological devastation and degradation occasioned by the neglect of 
international standards in oil exploration activities by transnational oil corporations (TOCs).  
The TOCs in the Niger Delta include Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria 
(Shell) and ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron, Elf, Agip (Eni) and Texaco (Carmody 2011, p. 114; 
Ibaba 2011, pp. 258-259). Shell operated for over three decades in Ogoniland until protests 
forced it to stop in 1993 (UNEP 2011, p. 25). The United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) has expressed the fear that 
The environmental restoration of Ogoniland could prove to be the world’s most wide-
ranging and long term oil clean-up exercise ever undertaken if contaminated drinking 
water, land, creeks and important ecosystems such as mangroves are to be brought 
back to full, productive health. (UNEP 2011a, p. 1) 
In the context of such a socially challenging environment, protesting civil society groups, 
organised or otherwise (Ikelegbe 2001) gave way to militias and subsequently violence 
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(Carmody 2011, pp. 113-114, Ibaba 2011, pp. 251-257). There was sabotage, bombing of oil-
installations and government infrastructure, kidnapping as well as attacks and killing of 
military and security personnel deployed to the area (Ogege 2011, pp. 249-250; Osumah and 
Aghedo 2011). In response, the state continued the militarisation of the area (Amnesty 2009a; 
2009b). In short, there is a clear parallel between the restiveness in the area and what has 
dovetailed into an unprecedented level of violence now being experienced in the northern 
part of the country. 
Faced with a failing military strategy late President Yar’ Adua offered an olive branch in the 
nature of an amnesty programme to the militant groups (Otite and Umukoro 2011). This 
programme, to which hundreds of millions of dollars has ostensibly been committed in 
technical and vocational training for the “ex-militants” has led to cognisable reduction of the 
restiveness in that part of the country. This has been coupled with the setting up of a Ministry 
of the Niger Delta to directly address issues of infrastructural development in the region. This 
approach has attracted some criticisms.  
Critics have expressed the view that the government’s amnesty programme is merely 
diversionary. Some consider it a ploy to defuse the restiveness in the Niger Delta to ensure 
“business as usual” for the government and the powerful TOCS without the political will to 
empower the people of the region or address serious environmental degradation that has 
taken place (and continues) there (Ogege 2011). Such apprehension is not completely without 
justification. There is the government’s extremely restricted consultation with stakeholders, 
the rather questionable deployment of tremendous financial resources to only those identified 
as “ex-militants” (Ibaba 2011, p. 264) and the dubious, overnight transformation of erstwhile 
leaders of some militant groups to multi-millionaires (Carmody 2011, p. 115). Allegations of 
corruption have also trailed the whole process from payments for surrendered weapons, 
identification of “ex-militants,” to disbursement of stipends to them (Oluwaniyi 2011, p. 50-
54; National Mirror 18 October 2012). There is also the spectre of fickle commitment to 
well-grounded socio-economic policies by successive administrations in the country (Igboin 
2012, p. 90-91). Notwithstanding these anomalies, it is empirically ascertainable that the 
attacks against the state have being considerably minimised with the country now faced with 
taking forward a basic rights approach to the crisis in the area (Oluwaniyi 2011, p.54).   
Still applying the CTS ethic of emancipation described by McDonald as entailing concern for 
“opening up of space for non-repressive dialogue” (2007, p. 255), the amnesty option, while 
not flawless, is arguably the most viable to resolving the restiveness in the Niger Delta 
region. This is because at the core of the amnesty programme is the engagement of the state 
with subaltern agitations of minorities arising from longstanding claims of marginalisation. 
Peace and conflict research findings show that this approach is quite useful because the 
perception that government cares goes a long way in assuaging feelings of resentment and 
exclusion that generate rebellion and violence against the state (Taydas and Peksen 2012, p. 
284; Burgoon 2006). That persisting dysfunctional governance arrangements militate against 
optimal results from the process does not justify discarding such non-repressive engagement. 
It is to be preferred to the continued perniciousness that has characterised the militarisation of 
various sites of political violence in the country. The results of the introduction of limited 
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socio-economic measures into the options for achieving peace in the Niger Delta supports the 
adoption of a similar approach to securing sustainable peace in the country as a whole. 
However, there is a correlating requirement to also address the virtual absence of due process 
in governance in the country to achieve stronger, sustainable results. 
 
Due process – curbing corruption, checking Impunity 
Due process here refers to the realisation that power has the tendency to corrupt and so there 
is a critical need to check its exercise particularly on the part of the state. This is ensured 
through procedural and substantive measures. Due process constrains the application of 
governmental power by requiring that policies and actions of government officials are not 
arbitrary. The central idea of substantive due process is the requirement that the business of 
governance is conducted by officials “on public spirited rather than self-interested or 
invidious motivations, and there must be a ‘rational’ or reasonable relationship between 
government’s ends and its means” (Fallon 1993, p. 95). 
The thinness of due process in the country in its procedural and substantive forms - requiring 
compliance with laid down rules and that those rules must be reasonable and not self-serving 
respectively, transcends government’s fiscal activities. It permeates all the structures of 
governance in Nigeria. For instance, the absence of due process and transparency in the 
conduct of government’s contract and procurement activities facilitates grand theft of public 
funds. This led to the establishment of the “Due Process” Office – later Bureau for Public 
Procurement in the early years of the Obasanjo administration (Okonjo-Iweala 2012, pp. 88-
89).  
The focus here is however limited to two aspects; political corruption as a reflection of 
absence of due process and impunity in the conduct of security agencies in carrying out 
otherwise legitimate duties. It is estimated that Nigeria has made over 400 billion dollars 
from oil exports in six decades but more than 80% of that figure has accrued to a mere 1% of 
the population (Carmody 2011, pp. 113-114). Given the level of poverty in the country 
despite this earnings, it is little wonder there is widespread disenchantment with the state 
manifesting in among others, conflict and violence  as represented by the activities of groups 
like the Boko Haram and militancy in the Niger Delta.  
There is a link not only between poverty and violence but also between corruption and 
violence. Corruption delegitimises the state and fractures the relationship between 
government (state) and the people (society). Corruption of state officials undermines the rule 
of law and the authority of the state leading to hostility of citizens who come to view the state 
as an “enemy” (UNODC 2005, p. 89). In such circumstances, citizens tend to resort to the use 
of force and self-help; making outbreaks of violence a real possibility (Yusuf 2012, p. 451). 
Ibaba has described how the incidence of grand political corruption has led to a “frustration-
aggression trap” resulting in the development of militias and violence in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria (Ibaba 2011, p. 257-263). It is instructive that three former Governors of 
three different states in the region have since been convicted for large theft of public funds, 
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the most notorious being James Ibori, convicted by a London court in 2012 (The Guardian 17 
April 2012) after a drawn out indictment in Nigeria (Yusuf 2011).  
An emancipatory agenda involves “drawing attention to and prioritising the needs and 
concerns of those most vulnerable” in the sites of political violence both at the point of 
incidence and in response to it (McDonald 2007, p. 257). Applied to the Boko Haram 
experience, this entails, at least in part, the imperative of curbing corruption in Nigeria since 
it is a major predisposing factor to social violence. Pham has observed that a viable approach 
to ending incessant violence in the country involves “dramatic action” to end corruption and 
the establishment of a “more inclusive” government to address socio-economic needs of the 
majority (2012, p. 7).  
As mentioned above, there is also an urgent need to pursue due process through checking the 
impunity of the state and its agencies, especially the security forces. Extra-judicial killings by 
the security agencies deployed to “keep the peace” in the northern part of the country, has 
continued till date (National Human Rights Commission 2013; Amnesty 2012, p. 19-39). It is 
a fact that the neglect of due process manifested in the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed 
Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram group. This incident notably triggered or at least, 
significantly contributed to engendering the spate of violence and terror the country is now 
witnessing (Pham 2012, p. 2-5; Maiangwa et al 2012, p. 47-49). The group to which it has 
been controversially linked or compared; the Maitatsine (a heretic group as far as most 
Muslims are concerned), was itself brutally wiped out by state security forces in the 1980s 
(Walker 2012, p. 1, Adesoji 2011).  
One of the central contributions of CTS scholarship is how it draws attention not only to the 
dialectics of how the West has provoked violence from the “other (s)” (Herring and Stokes 
2011, p. 1) but also how the Westphalian state as an outgrowth of western political 
arrangements employs a tradition of violence-to-combat-violence in asserting sovereignty 
(Tellidis 2009, p. 185). This latter tradition speaks to how successive military regimes 
institutionalised impunity, learning from the historical legacy of colonialism in the country. 
The Nigerian state has continued on a trajectory of counter-violence that has done nothing but 
lead to a cycle of blood and tears with a hapless populace at the receiving end. Recently, 
Bukar Abba Ibrahim, a Senator (and former Governor of Yobe State) representing parts of 
the epicentre of the Boko Haram insurgency, denounced security agencies for killing more 
people than the Boko Haram and making matters worse for the people, contrary to official 
claims. He noted that Boko Haram had existed for “ages” as a peaceful group but the 
impunity of the security agencies, particularly the Police, provoked it to violence against the 
state. He lamented that whenever a security agent was harmed in any way, the security forces 
respond by cordoning off such an area and burning down all property there. “What,” he 
wondered “has [burning] property got to do with people killing security agents on the road?”  
(The Nation 9 November 2012).  
The experience of impunity in the campaign against the Boko Haram vindicates the view 
within CTS that an approach to political violence that neglects or rejects liberal democratic 
values like due process and fair-hearing invariably undermines the campaign against terror 
19 
 
(McDonald 2007, p. 256). The impunity of state security agents has only served to further 
delegitimise the state in an already polarised and politically charged atmosphere. The 
implications of such a context ought to be considered in analysis of the recurring violence in 
the country. On a CTS framing, it is important to advert to all forms of political violence or 
terror, including that of the state, in seeking to address the experience (Jackson et al 2011, p. 
174-194; Blakeley 2009). It is high time the government addressed the penchant for impunity 
for which the country’s security agencies have become notorious internationally (Open 
Society 2010; Amnesty 2012). There is a need for the Nigerian government to adopt a due-
process approach with zero-tolerance for human rights violations and impunity from state and 
non-state actors alike. It is imperative that the State “re-invent itself” as “its failure at all 
levels has been an excuse for the inveterate terrorist convolutions” the country has witnessed 
(Igboin 2012, p. 91). 
 
Conclusion: connecting the state to society 
A CTS discursive approach emphasises the need to identify with the context of political 
violence and terror. Applied to the Nigerian experience, it is germane to introspect on the 
context of that violence in seeking to address the Boko Haram crises in the cycle of recurring 
violence in the country. The development of the group in North-East Nigeria is set in the 
background of resentment against the state. The insurgency derives not merely from 
ideological (religious) fundamentalism, but can, on critical inquiry, be located in the 
governance gap and neglect of basic rights set out above. This commends a liberal approach 
as the main route to addressing the violence of the group and a number of others in ferment in 
the country, and indeed in other contested spaces.  
An analysis that adopts the core commitments of CTS and in particular, an ethic of 
emancipation, interrogates narratives that elide the notorious fact of the context of state 
impunity, in the denial of basic rights. In the experience of dysfunctional states like Nigeria 
the legacies of colonial rule, authoritarian governance and political corruption have combined 
to erode state legitimacy among an increasing majority grappling with poverty with widening 
gaps between the rich and poor. The deficiency in state legitimacy is a critical issue in such 
contexts which ought to be accorded critical attention in efforts to understand and address 
recurring political violence. Such enquiry, while already implicit in a CTS approach to 
political violence ought to be progressed and deepened through interdisciplinary 
collaboration among cognate fields.   
While the transition from authoritarianism to civil democratic rule is desirable, it is far from 
being itself a virtue that promotes the well-being of societies in Africa. Where it simply 
translates to nothing more than the conduct of (multi) party elections, as has mainly being the 
experience in Nigeria, it only exacerbates frustration and alienation among majority of the 
population. This fosters a situation in which individuals become liable to “being mobilised 
around counter-elites who exploit extant popular alienation from the state by whipping up 
sectarian sentiments” (Ukiwo 2003, p. 120). An important way out from the situation of 
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violence and terrorism in Nigeria is firstly for the state to abandon denial – it is stark that 
there is a grave disconnect between state and society in many African countries. Nigeria is 
sadly one of the most poignant representation of that in the period of its post-authoritarian 
transition; an irony given the expectations of a post authoritarian society.  
The Niger Delta amnesty programme as an instance of socio-economic intervention falls 
short of institutionalising ESC rights. However, its aftermath, even if only to a limited extent, 
suggests there is considerable value in following a rights-sensitive approach as a critical 
measure in addressing violence and conflict confronting many developing countries. This is 
especially the case with those in sub-Sahara Africa. Substitution of state-denial and counter-
violence with acknowledgement and a measure of engagement with aspects of socio-
economic marginalisation of the people is a positive measure. The political will to adopt 
rights sensitive approach to political violence will contribute significantly to achieving 
sustainable peace in the country. It is important to note that the introduction of the ESC rights 
alone, without the additional component of observing due process by government and its 
agencies, will lead to a still-birth of any positive promise the measure holds.  
It is commonly argued that resource constraints militate against the constitutionalisation and 
realisation of ESC rights. However, there is a sound argument to be made for its expedience 
in the same countries that have been excused for neglecting these rights on the basis of 
resource constrains. It is typical to find that neglect of ESC rights in developing countries like 
Nigeria typically cohere with high security spending on importation of weapons for security 
forces; paradoxically to secure usually elusive peace. That has gone unquestioned by the 
prominent players in the international system quick to move in with military assistance to 
help “secure the peace” in conflict zones in the developing countries - witness the situation in 
Mali. This has to be addressed.      
Violence like that ensuing from the Boko Haram insurgency has arisen principally from 
governance gaps and a critical assessment suggests that African governments and their 
foreign allies in the “War on Terror” have to face up to that fact for viable solutions beyond 
militarisation. “Boko Haram” Davis suggests, “is Nigeria’s reflection in the mirror, and the 
country does not like what it sees” (2012, p. 16). One can usefully add that the violence in 
many other parts of Africa are similarly mirror-reflections of a governance gap which if left 
unaddressed, will continue to dodge the steps of development and stability on the continent. 
Domestic and international policy responses to the current situation of violence and conflict 
in other developing countries and especially those in sub-Sahara Africa like the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and lately, Mali ought to engage with this 
reality.  
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Notes 
                                                             
1 ‘Key Note Address by EU Commissioner Andris Piebalgs to the “High-Level Forum on International 
Cooperation’” (Milan, Italy 1 October 2012). 
2
 I use this appellation for the group throughout this piece as it is the common, though derisive one by which it 
is known. 
3 There are reputedly over 250 ethnic groups in the country.   
4 The Yoruba (of the south-west of the country) being the main oddity in this regard. 
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